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Abstract. Automated vulnerability searching tools have led to a dra-
matic increase of the rate at which such flaws are discovered. One partic-
ular searching technique is fault injection – i.e. insertion of random data
into input files, buffers or protocol packets, combined with a systematic
monitoring of memory violations. Even if these tools allow to uncover
a lot of vulnerabilities, they are still very primitive; despite their poor
efficiency, they are useful because of the very high density of such vul-
nerabilities in modern software. This paper presents an innovative buffer
overflow uncovering technique, which uses a more thorough and reliable
approach. This technique, called fuzzing by weighting attacks with mark-
ers, is a specialized kind of fault injection, which does not need source
code or special compilation for the monitored program. As a proof of
concept of the efficiency of this technique, a tool called Autodafe´ has
been developed. It allows to detect automatically an impressive number
of buffer overflow vulnerabilities.
keywords: fuzzer, buffer overflow, weighting attacks with markers tech-
nique, fault injection, autodafe.
1 Introduction
1.1 Buffer Overflows
When programming in a high-level language, like C, variables are declared using
data type. These data types can range from integer to characters to custom user-
defined structures. One reason this is necessary is to properly allocate space for
each variables. C assumes that the programmer is responsible for data integrity.
If this responsibility was shifted to the compiler, the resulting binaries would be
significantly slower (Java, Perl, Python, C#, etc.), due to integrity checks on
every variable. Also, this would remove a significant level of control from the
programmer. This feature increases the programmer’s control and the efficiency
of the resulting programs. But it can also reduce the reliability and the security
of the programs. If a programmer want to write ten bytes of data in a buffer of
only two bytes of memory space, the compiler will consider this action as allowed
even if it will crash the program. This is known as a buffer overflow, since extra
bytes of data are written after the allocated space of memory.
Nowadays, the term buffer overflow has become synonymous with vulnera-
bility or flaw, because it is sometimes possible to use buffer overflows to over-
write critical pieces of data in programs and take control of a process/computer.
Poorly constructed software programs may have weaknesses such as stack over-
flows, heap overflows, integer overflows, off-by-one overflows, and format string
bugs. For more information about buffer overflows, we recommend [9], [12], [17]
and [19].
1.2 Structure of this paper
In this paper, we first explain in Section 2 how buffer overflows are currently
uncovered. We will present four different techniques, with their pros and cons.
Section 3 describes more precisely the technique of fuzzing or fault injection.
Section 4 presents a more reliable approach by using a technique called fuzzing
by weighting attacks with markers. We finally present a proof of concept of this
technique, a tool called Autodafe´ which allows to automatically uncover an im-
pressive number of buffer overflow vulnerabilities.
2 Uncovering buffer overflows
Contrary to popular belief, it is nearly impossible to determine if vulnerabilities
are being identified and disclosed at an increasing or decreasing rate. According
to the CERT[5] the number of disclosed vulnerabilities each year is:
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1,090 2,437 4,129 3,784 3,780 2,8741
Table 1. Number of disclosed vulnerabilities per year
During the first semester of 2005, 15.75 vulnerabilities were disclosed every
day. Approximately one third concerned buffer overflows. In order to uncover
buffer overflows, roughly four techniques are used by automated tools. They
follow chronologically the production of software programs.
2.1 Static Analysis
Automated Source Code Analysis Tools.
At the beginning, a software program is a source code. Functions in the standard
C library such as strcpy do not perform automatically array-bound checks.
1 This is the number of disclosed vulnerabilities during the first semester of 2005 only.
Programs using these weak functions2 have the possibility to suffer from the
buffer overflow vulnerability. By having access to the source code, an auditor
is able to check if weak functions are used. Syntactic analyzers like RATS[18],
Flawfinder[24] or Splint[23] can uncover these kinds of vulnerability.
In general, the current set of automated static analysis tools is lacking when
it comes to uncover the relatively complicated vulnerabilities found in modern
software.
Automated Binary Code Analysis Tools.
Sometimes source code is not available. Automated binary code analysis is still
possible using machine language or dynamic library calls. Currently, there is no
security related tool able to detect buffer overflows. Tools like Objdump[15] or
APISpy32[21] give a list of the called functions, which can be unsafe.
Generally, Most of the work is done by decompilers like IDA[7] and a long
and hard manual work.
2.2 Dynamic Analysis
Automated Running Analysis Tools.
If the binary code is available, executing software programs can significantly
reduce the work of an auditor. Indeed running software programs give access
to the reachable i.e. useful portion of code. Tools such as Valgrind[13] allow to
highlight bad memory management: double freed, unfreed chunks of memory
and calls of unsafe functions. Debuggers like GDB[16], Ollydbg[25], Strace[14],
or Ltrace[6] are very efficient too, but they are not security related and the work
is still close to a manual approach.
Fault Injection.
Fault injection or fuzzing is not a fully independent technique. Fault injection is
normally combined with automated running analysis tools in order to simulate
the use of the targeted software programs. The word fuzzing comes from fuzz[3],
the first fault injection tool dedicated to uncover buffer overflows. This naive
but efficient approach for finding buffer overflows is basically to supply long
arguments or inputs to a program and see what happens. Fuzzers like Spike[2]
and Peach[8] use a more advanced techniques.
Other tools like PROTOS[20] or Security Bug Catcher[22], much closer to
fault injection than fuzzing are more complex. Using a complete specification
of a protocol and an automated finite state machine describing the states of a
2 printf, vprintf, vsprintf, wprintf, vwprintf, vswprintf, sprintf, swprintf, fprintf, fw-
printf, getenv, strcat, strncat, strcpy, strncpy, stpcpy, memcpy, memccpy, bcopy,
memmove, gets, system, popen, scanf, sscanf, fscanf, vfscanf, vsscanf, realpath, fgets,
etc.
software program, they are able to detect if sensible states can be bypassed. Thus,
this kind of tool is able to detect if an authenticated procedure can be evaded
due to buffer overflows or design errors. Unfortunately, these tools must have
a complete description of the protocols and the states of the audited software
programs which represent a hard and long manual work.
3 Fuzzing
Black box testing with fault injection and stress testing, i.e. fuzzing, is an ap-
proach whereby an auditor uses sets of scripts designed to feed a program various
inputs, different in size and structure. It is usually possible to specify how this
input should be constructed and maybe how the tool should change it according
to the program’s behavior.
The first fuzzer fuzz[3], created in 1990 by Miller, Fredriksen and So, is
basically a stream generator of random characters. It produces a continuous
string of characters on its standard output file. Tested on ninety different utility
programs on seven versions of UNIX, it was able to crash more than 24% of them.
In 1995 Miller et al.[10] revisited the experiment trying to categorize the cause
of these failure and compared GNU software with commercial software. In 2000
Miller and Forrester[4] tried to fuzz thirty GUI-based Windows NT applications
using stream generator and random Windows messages. They were able to crash
21% of these applications.
Random testing can be considered as too trivial to be reliable. Indeed, soft-
ware programs use protocols. E.g. ssh servers intend to receive at the beginning
a version string:
SSH-1.99-openSSH_4.2
If the fuzzer is only able to send random characters, the probability to obtain
a valid version string which passes the check is close to zero. In a paper[1]
published in 2002, Dave Aitel describes an effective method, called Block-Based
Protocol Analysis, implemented in Spike[2], the most used fuzzer. Protocols can
be decomposed into length fields and data fields: consider the case where an
auditor wants to send a long character string to a web server using HTTP. It
is not enough to simply modify a captured request by replacing a variable with
a longer string. The auditor must also update the Content-Length field in the
HTTP header (POST). Block-Based Protocol Analysis allows the auditor to
create blocks of data binded to length variables. Thus if the size of a block of
data is modified due to string substitutions, the fuzzer is able to recalculate
the correct size and send a request with a correct length value3. Moreover, this
technique permits a complete description of protocols, delimiting fixed strings
and variables.
With a block-based description of protocols, fuzzers can drastically reduce
the size of the potential space of inputs.
3 Sending a request with a wrong size can highlight vulnerabilities called Integer over-
flows. Fuzzers should be able to test this kind of flaw too.
Potential Space of Inputs
The cardinality of the potential space of inputs defines the complexity of fault
injectors: fuzzers basically substitute variables for smaller, bigger and malformed
strings or values. By using a random character string generator, Fuzz[3] owns
an infinite potential space of inputs. In order to reduce the complexity, most
advanced fuzzers combine three techniques:
Partial description of protocols. In order to omit useless tests. See ssh ex-
ample above.
Block-based protocols analysis. This technique permits to recalculate length
fields after substituting data. See HTTP example above.
Library of substituted strings or values. Substituting variables with ran-
dom values is irrelevant. Using a library of finite substituted strings or values
drastically reduces the size of the potential space of inputs. E.g. in order to
highlight format string bugs, only a few character strings are tested, contain-
ing all the interpreted sequences4
Thus, the complexity of a fuzz test can be defined by the number of substitution:
Complexity = LF
Where L is the number of substituted strings or values contained in the library
and F is the number of fuzzed variables. Spike uses a library with 681 entries
in version 2.9 but for deep analysis, the number of entries in the library of
substituted strings or values should be much bigger (dozens of thousands).
Although these optimizations increase the efficiency of fuzzers, the size of
the potential space of inputs still needlessly wide. In order to affect the com-
plexity, both L and F can be reduced. Bringing down the size of the library of
substituted strings or values L is not relevant. Each entries in L is based on the
discovery of a buffer overflow. Omitting entries can make the fuzzer less effective.
However, limiting or arrange the fuzzed variables F could dramatically reduce
the complexity.
4 Weighting Attacks with Markers Technique
This technique is used to reduce the complexity of fuzzers. If L is composed
of dozens of thousands entries, removing one input in F is profitable. So, if an
auditor has access to the software program (grey-boxing), he can use tracers or
debuggers to obtain more information for his fuzzing.
Definition 1 (Tracer). A tracer is a debugger able to list every dynamically
called function of a software program.
4 Interpreted sequences are used by libc functions like printf to describe printable
arguments. For example, strings are defined by “%s” and integers by “%d”.
By combining runtime analysis tool with fuzzer, it is possible to know when
unsafe functions like strcpy are used. Moreover if a vulnerability is discovered,
debug functions can be used to detail the cause.
Using unsafe functions is critical when theirs arguments can be modified or
controlled by users.
Definition 2 (Marker). Every character string or value controlled by users
(locally or remotely) is considered as a marker.
Procedure
Basically, the paradigm is to automatically analyse how markers are used by the
targeted software program. If a marker i.e. a controlled string or value, is used
as an argument by an unsafe function, a weight related to this marker increases.
When all markers are tested and weighted, the fuzzer will test firstly the markers
with larger weight. Thus the cases where the probability to find a buffer overflow
is superior are tested in the first place.
1. A partial description of the audited protocol is given to the fuzzer using a
block-based protocol language. Every canonical element is considered as a
marker. This language is defined to fragment the protocol in length fields
and data fields.
2. The fuzzer uses this description to simulate a normal (previously captured
and unmodified) communication with the targeted software program.
3. According to the block-based protocol language, some canonical elements
are tagged as markers. Thus the fuzzer send to the tracer the list of markers
it needs to watch.
4. The tracer starts the targeted software program and puts breakpoints to
every unsafe functions.
5. The tracer analyses the execution of the targeted software program in order
to detect if unsafe functions use markers.
6. If a marker is used by unsafe functions, the tracer gives a bigger weight to
the marker and communicates its results to the fuzzer.
7. According to the weight of markers, the fuzzer classify which markers should
be tested first. Markers which do not use vulnerable functions are not fuzzed
during the first pass.
8. Each weighted marker is substituted to every entry in the library, in order
to give rise to a buffer overflow.
9. If a fuzzed variable causes a buffer overflow, the tracer gives to the auditor
additional information about the state of the targeted software program.
By reducing the cardinality of F – the fuzzed variable space – and by ordering
it, the complexity is drastically declined.
5 Autodafe´
In this section, we present an implementation of the fuzzing by weighting attacks
with markers technique.
5.1 Block-Based Protocol Description Language
The block-based language used to describe protocols contains these functions:
string("dummy"); /* define a constant string */
string_uni("dummy"); /* define a constant unicode string */
hex(0x0a 0a \x0a); /* define a hexadecimal constant value */
block_begin("block"); /* define the beginning of a block */
block_end("block"); /* define the end of a block */
block_size_b32("block"); /* 32 bits big-endian size of a block */
block_size_l32("block"); /* 32 bits little-endian size of a block */
block_size_b16("block"); /* 16 bits big-endian size of a block */
block_size_l16("block"); /* 16 bits little-endian size of a block */
block_size_8("block"); /* 8 bits size of a block */
block_size_8("block"); /* 8 bits size of a block */
block_size_hex_string("block"); /* hexadecimal string size of a block */
block_size_dec_string("block"); /* decimal string size of a block */
block_crc32_b("block"); /* crc32 of a block in big-endian */
block_crc32_l("block"); /* crc32 of a block in little-endian */
send("block"); /* send the block */
recv("block"); /* receive the block */
fuzz_string("dummy"); /* fuzz the string "dummy" */
fuzz_string_uni("dummy"); /* fuzz the unicode string "dummy" */
fuzz_hex(0xff ff \xff); /* fuzz the hexadecimal value */
With these functions it is possible to reproduce almost every binary-based or
string-based protocol. Writing protocol descriptions is a hard manual task. In
order to help auditors Autodafe´ uses a tool called adc which verifies the syn-
tax of the script and convert correct files into a specific format. Moreover, the
Ethereal[11] protocol recognition engine is used by the tool pdml2ad to automati-
cally recover 530 existing protocols by capturing legitimate communications: E.g.
this is the automatically recovered description of the first packet sent during a
ssh connection using the autodafe language script:
block_begin("packet_1");
// name : ssh.protocol
// showname: Protocol: SSH-1.99-OpenSSH_4.2\n
// show : SSH-1.99-OpenSSH_4.2\x0a
// size : 21 (0x15)
string("SSH-1.99-OpenSSH_4.2");
hex(0a); /* \n */
block_end("packet_1");
recv("packet_1");
The autodafe language script is not only able to describe network based
protocols but also file formats like pdf, gif, jpeg, bmp, MS-Word, Postscript, etc.
5.2 The fuzzer
The fuzzer engine, called autodafe, is connected to a tracer, called adbg, by
using a TCP connection. Together, they can send fuzzed variables according to
a modifiable substituted strings and values library and implement the technique
of fuzzing by weighting attacks with markers. Both Microsoft Windows based
and Unix based versions of the tracer are available.
5.3 Results
By using this technique we were able to uncover eighty known buffer overflows
and 865 new unreleased buffer overflows in modern software.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented techniques used to uncover automatically buffer
overflow vulnerabilities. In particular we have detailed fault injection or fuzzing
– i.e. insertion of malformed data into input files, buffer or protocol packets. We
have defined the complexity of these automated tools and the most advanced
techniques used to reduce it. We have presented an innovative buffer overflow
uncovering technique, called fuzzing by weighting attacks with markers, which
uses a more thorough and reliable approach, by combining a runtime analysis
tool with a fuzzer. As a proof of concept of the efficiency of this technique, a
tool called Autodafe´ has been developed which is able to detect an impressive
number of buffer overflow vulnerabilities.
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